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What drives fidelity to internet voting? Evidence from the roll–out
of internet voting in Switzerland
Abstract
To date, most of our knowledge regarding individuals’ propensity to internet vote comes
from cross sectional survey data. In this paper we try to break new ground by tracking
individuals’ actual behaviour over time. Specifically, we analyze citizens’ choice of voting
channel by exploiting a unique longitudinal dataset –the Canton of Geneva’s vote registry
database. Our aim is to explore patterns in the propensity to use internet voting among
eligible voters. To this end, we first mine the registry data to identify a subset of voters
that have experimented with internet voting. In a second stage, we explore the e↵ects of
key socio–demographic variables on individual voters’ fidelity to internet voting. Our re-
sults are counter–intuitive. While the conventional wisdom is that younger voters are most
likely to be mobilised to use the internet voting channel, we show that this is not the case
in one of the few political systems where internet voting is readily available. Indeed, our
evidence suggests that it is older voters rather than ‘digital natives’ (i.e., the younger voters)
that are most likely to remain faithful to internet voting once they have experimented with it.
Keywords: Internet voting, Public policy, Federalism, Direct democracy, Data mining
1. Introduction
In recent years the debate on internet voting –hereafter abbreviated to iVoting– has
moved from more theoretical debates about the prospects or perils associated with iVoting
to one that is informed by the availability of empirical data. Significant trials involving
iVoting have been conducted in a number of countries across the globe: Estonia (Solvak
and Vassil, 2016), Norway (Segaard and Saglie, 2012; Segaard et al., 2014), Switzerland
(Serdu¨lt et al., 2015b), The Netherlands and the UK in Europe, Australia (Smith, 2016),
and Canada and the US in North America (Hall, 2015). Not surprisingly, given the range of
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political systems this encompasses, the type of election that has been the object of iVoting
trials has varied across cases. In many instances the trials have focused on parliamentary
elections, in the US it was the Democratic primaries, while in Switzerland the attention has
been mostly on referendum votes. It has been common to first conduct experiments with
low salience elections, such as local elections, before ‘upgading’ to higher salience national
elections. The roll out of iVoting in Estonia neatly illustrates this dynamic (Alvarez et al.,
2009; Solvak and Vassil, 2016).
From a global perspective, the two countries with the richest experience in the use of
iVoting to date are Estonia and Switzerland -both with over a decade of experimentation
behind them (Hall, 2015). In terms of lesson drawing, however, the two cases provide very
di↵erent insights. Estonia and Switzerland are both small in global population terms (1.3
and 8.3 million inhabitants respectively) yet they di↵er quite markedly in their territorial
structure. Whereas Estonia is a centralized and unitary state, Switzerland is one of the most
decentralized federal systems in the world. This a↵ects the implementation of iVoting, which
is a largely bottom–up process in Switzerland driven by pioneer sub–national units compared
to the top–down approach in Estonia (Mendez, 2010). This in turn has a↵ected the roll out
of iVoting, a piecemeal approach with competing systems among the sub–national units in
Switzerland versus a unified and swiftly generalised national solution in Estonia (Mendez and
Serdu¨lt, 2014). Lastly there is the object of the iVoting solution, in Estonia it is mostly geared
towards elections while in Switzerland iVoting is mostly about referendums. This last point
is important given the central role played by instruments of direct democracy, such as the
referendum and the initiative, in the Swiss political system. In fact, in federalist Switzerland
it is the cantons that are in charge of implementing referendum votes and elections, not
only the sub–national ones but the national ones too. Another critical feature is the fact
that remote forms of voting via mail are already generalized in the Swiss case. The iVoting
procedure is therefore an additional channel of voting to pre–existing remote voting forms
by mail.
In view of its federalised context, vibrant tradition of direct democracy and institution-
alised forms of remote voting by mail, the potential for lesson drawing from the Swiss case
will be especially pertinent for some of the classic federations. Possessing a somewhat atyp-
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ical political system for a European country, Switzerland is often compared in the literature
with the subnational units in the US with a tradition of direct democracy, such as California
and Oregon, that have institutionalised the referendum and initiative procedures (Qvortrup,
2014). Indeed, as in Switzerland, these two US states have also more or less generalised
voting by mail (in the case of Oregon it is the only form of voting) (on mail voting in the US
see Gerber et al. (2013). The broader research question that therefore animates this paper
is what happens when iVoting is introduced in such a federalised context and one where
remote forms of voting are already well established. The focus is on individual voters that
have experimented with iVoting. The specific research question is to what extent do voters
remain loyal to the iVoting channel after having used it? Furthermore, which type of voter
is more likely to remain faithful to iVoting and which type more likely to ‘switch’ among
available voting channels.
Answering these research questions has some important policy implications that may be
generalisable beyond the Swiss case. To tackle these questions we exploit a unique data
source –the Canton of Geneva’s vote registry database– which we use to track citizens’
actual behaviour in terms of selecting among di↵erent available voting channels over time.
The article proceeds as follows. We first review in Section 2 the literature on what we know
about the profile of iVoters and derive four hypotheses to structure our investigation. Section
3 describes the dataset, our case selection and the methods used. Section 4 then presents
the results of the empirical analysis while the concluding section discusses the implications
of our work, as well as its limitations, and future research directions.
2. Theory and Hypotheses
We begin by reviewing the literature on what we know about iVoting and iVoters. We
draw a distinction between empirical studies that focus on ‘intent’ to iVote, which are usually
based on the hypothetical scenario of whether a prospective voter would use iVoting if given
the opportunity (e.g. Powell et al. (2012); Christian Schaupp and Carter (2005); Choi
and Kim (2012)), on the one hand, and empirical studies that are based on actual trials of
iVoting on the other. It is the latter literature which constitutes our main point of theoretical
departure (Table 1 provides an overview). Usually this literature covers cases where repeated
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Table 1: Summary of main empirical studies dealing with the determinants iVoting
Author(s) Case1 Year(s) Publication2 Data Source3 N iVoters Sample D.V.4
Christin and Trechsel 2004 CH: Geneva 2004 Report OS 1132 iVoters NA
Christin and Trechsel 2005 CH: Geneva 2004 WP S 123 Electorate iVoting vs. Postal/Ballot
Serdu¨lt and Trechsel 2006 CH: Zurich 2005 Report S 74 Electorate iVoting vs. Postal/Ballot
Serdu¨lt 2010 CH: Geneva 2009 Proceedings OS 2467 Expat NA
VR 4819 Expat population iVoting vs. Postal/Ballot
Sciarini et al. 2013 CH: Geneva 2011 Report S 207 Electorate iVoting vs. Postal/Ballot
OS 4908 iVoters NA
VRP 13310 Population iVoting vs Postal ballot
Germann et al. 2014 CH: AG/BS/GR/SG 2011 Proceedings S 110 Expat iVoting vs Postal
Goodman 2014 Canada:Markham 2003 Chapter OS 3655 Electorate NA
Breuer and Trechsel 2006 Estonia 2005 Report S 315 Electorate iVoting vs Ballot
Trechsel et al. 2007 Estonia 2007 Report S 367 Electorate iVoting vs Ballot
Alvarez et al. 2009 Estonia 2005/2007 Journal S 682 Electorate iVoting vs Ballot
VR 30275 Population Descriptives
Bochsler 2010 Estonia 2007 WP S 367 Electorate iVoting vs Ballot
Alvarez and Nagler 2001 US: Primaries AZ 2000 WP VR 35768 Democrats iVoting vs. Postal/Ballot
Solop 2001 US: Primaries AZ 2000 Journal S 318 Democrats iVoting vs. Postal/Ballot
Prevost and Scha↵ner 2008 US: Primaries MI 2004 Journal VR 4972 Democrats iVoting vs. Postal/Ballot
Bergh and Christensen 2012 Norway: Local 2011 Chapter S 1037 Electorate iVoting vs non–Voters
VR 27738 Population iVoting vs Ballot
Henry 2003 UK: Local 2002 Proceedings OS 3310 Electorate NA
Note: The compilation of empirical studies draws on the meta–analysis in Serdu¨lt et al. (2015a).
1 CH is an abbreviation for Switzerland.
2 In the publications column WP refers to a Working Paper while Journal refers to a peer reviewed journal article.
3 The abbreviations for the data source column are: S = Survey (in most cases a traditional telephone survey based
on random sampling); OS = Online survey (iVoters that have been invited to fill in questionnaire after iVoting);
VR = Vote registry data; VRP = Vote Registry Panel data (this only applies to longitudinal data where the same
individuals are tracked).
4 D.V. refers to the dependent variable of the study. Note, NA (not applicable) is used mostly for online surveys
of iVoters. Typically such studies present descriptives of socio-demographic profiles rather than engage in statistical
modeling exercises.
iVoting trials have been conducted, even if iVoting has subsequently been abandoned as in
Norway or the UK. We first review what we know about the profile of iVoters, with greater
attention to those cases where iVoting is becoming a more generalised feature of the electoral
landscape (as listed in Table 1).
We begin by noting the columns in Table 1, which provides a meta–analysis of the
empirical literature on iVoting.1 Note that our focus is on country cases where significant
trials of iVoting have taken place. There are six country cases that have generated some of the
most important empirical studies on iVoting. Interestingly, not all countries have continued
with their initial iVoting experimentation, as is the case for Norway and the UK. The type of
election varies too. In many cases, experimentation has taken place at the local level, at least
initially. Estonia is the only case that has generalized iVoting for what is usually considered
first–order elections, i.e., general elections. The US cases all stem from two experiments with
1This draws on the extended meta–analysis provided in Serdu¨lt et al. (2015a).
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iVoting for Democratic primaries in 2000 and 2004. While for Switzerland the examples are
all related to referendum votes. The ‘year’ column covers the year of the trials that were
studied. In most cases, the empirical studies are one–shot analyses dealing with a single trial
although there are some that o↵er a longitudinal perspective. However, hardly any of these
longitudinal studies draw on panel data, i.e. tracking the same individuals over time. In the
case of (Goodman, 2014), the analysis involves comparing the aggregate descriptives at two
time points. Other analyses are based on more fully specified statistical models involving two
or more time points (Alvarez et al., 2009; Trechsel and Vassil, 2011). As far as we are aware,
only one study, a report, uses a longitudinal panel study to track the same individuals over
time for more than one time point, an approach that is close to the one adopted in this paper
(Sciarini et al., 2013). This leads us to the ‘publication’ type column. What is immediately
apparent here is the limited number of journal articles, by which we refer to peer reviewed
papers. The top tier publications on the profile of iVoters have been studies based on either
the US or Estonia. The remainder have generally been reports, conference proceedings or
book chapters.
An important distinction among the various empirical studies is the type of data they
draw on (see fifth column in Table 1). There are two main data sources, surveys and vote
registry data. In a limited number of cases both data sources can be combined (repeated
rows in Table 1). Surveys come in two general forms, the traditional survey based on
random sampling and online surveys. One common approach in the design of the ‘traditional’
survey has been to oversample iVoters, especially in the earlier trials where the number of
iVoters in the population is a small fraction of the total electorate (Alvarez et al., 2009;
Serdu¨lt and Trechsel, 2006). The second type of survey, the online survey of iVoters, is
based on respondents that opt–in to an invitation to complete an online survey after having
iVoted. These types of designs are plagued by self–selection problems. For example the
aggregate statistics presented by (Goodman, 2014) are based on an online survey with a
response rate of less than 30 per cent of iVoters in some cases, which suggests caution
when deriving conclusions about the socio-demographic profile of iVoters. Clearly, given
the self–selection bias that can creep in with such designs, the traditional survey provides a
much more reliable data source. Another important data source is provided by vote registry
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records. However, vote registry data is not always used for individual level tracking but
rather to report summary statistics provided by the o cial sources (e.g. Alvarez et al.
2009). Furthermore, when vote registry data is used it tends to be cross–sectional, i.e., for a
single time point (one exception is the longitudinal vote registry data used by Sciarini et al.
2013). Since it covers the population of interest, a longitudinal panel study based on vote
registry data is ideally suited for tracking individuals’ behaviour over time.
The data source column is closely connected to the number of iVoters and sample columns
in Table 1. Obviously when vote registry data is used the N is much higher. Nonetheless,
it is worth noting the large variability in the N of iVoters, especially those studies based on
surveys. In terms of the sample drawn there are di↵erences among studies. The traditional
survey samples from the electorate, while online surveys typically draw samples from iVot-
ers. In some cases, as in Serdu¨lt (2010), the sample is drawn from the ex-patriot iVoting
electorate. With vote registry data there is no sample as such, instead the population (in
this cases of registered voters) is analysed. In the US cases, however, it is the registered
supporters of the Democratic Party.
In the last column of Table 1 we specify the dependent variable of the various studies.
There is much variability in what is being studied, and in particular to which group(s) iVoters
are being compared to (e.g. ballot voters, postal voters or non–voters). In many studies,
such as those drawing on online surveys of iVoters, it is not even possible to compare iVoters
to other groups (hence the NA in the relevant cells of Table 1). The latter studies tend
to focus on the socio-demographic profile of those self–selected respondents that completed
the questionnaires. In many cases it is misleading to even speak of a dependent variable
since what is being presented are mostly aggregate descriptives. In general this variability
renders any generalisation about the profiles of iVoters rather problematic. Still, as noted
in the meta–analysis of Serdu¨lt et al. (2015a), a number of significant predictors appear
to be associated with iVoting. Overall the age variable was most important, with young
voters (not necessarily the youngest cohort however) being the most frequent users. On the
other hand there is less consensus on the role of gender as a significant predictor even when
drawing on the same data source (e.g. compare Bochsler (2010); Breuer and Trechsel (2006).
More generally, where data on levels of IT use and knowledge were collected, such factors
6
appeared to be generally more important drivers of iVoting than socio–economic factors.
Apart from studies that focus on the profile of iVoters and the determinants of iVoting,
as listed in Table 1, the literature is also infused with some loftier theoretical –as well as
normative– goals. One of these is the impact of introducing iVoting on turnout rates. There
is good reason to be cautious about such expected e↵ects. Although we are long aware that
there are costs to voting (Downs, 1957), from a Downsian perspective the mere introduction
of iVoting is unlikely to a↵ect the ideological equilibrium of a political system or the saliency
of an electoral event –factors that would certainly impact on participation. As pointed out
by Riker and Ordeshook (1968) there is, however, a conveniency aspect to the calculus of
voting –in terms of the time and e↵ort spent. Indeed, recent studies have provided evidence
on the importance of convenience as a driver of iVoting for the case of Estonia, specifically
arguing that the probability of iVoting increases with distance to polling station (Solvak and
Vassil, 2016). Furthermore, they have even suggested a potential mobilisation e↵ect (i.e.,
inducing unlikely voters to turnout) for particular segments of the population (Solvak and
Vassil, 2016).
In terms of conveniency factors, unlike Estonia, in the Swiss case the e↵ects are most
likely to be rather small given the availability and widespread adoption of postal voting.
Nonetheless, iVoting does alter the voting period. Whereas postal voters have to mail the
ballot on the Wednesday to be sure it arrives in time to be counted, the iVoter can wait until
Saturday midday without having to leave the house (ballot box voters have until Sunday
morning). Indeed, according to Sciarini et al. (2013) iVoters exhibit pattern of very late
voting (in the last day and a half). While the convenience of iVoting seems unlikely to
increase turnout, it might lead iVoters to stick to this channel once they have experienced
it and found it easy to use.
This latter point leads to another range of theories that have been applied to iVoting,
technology adoption models (TAM) and di↵usion models. In terms of the TAM, Davis
(1989) basically posits that ease of use and perceived usefulness are key for a technology to
spread in a sustainable way, in our case to transform voting habits and make citizens switch
from mainly postal to increasingly iVoting. The theory has been applied to iVoting adoption
(Christian Schaupp and Carter, 2005; Choi and Kim, 2012). However, in both cases the focus
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was on ‘intent’ to iVote (rather than actual iVoting) and only included younger segments of
the population. A more promising line of inquiry, drawing on the work of Rogers (2003) is
the di↵usion of innovation theory that has been applied to the Estonian case (Solvak and
Vassil, 2016; Vassil et al., 2016). The central message here is that iVoting in the Estonian
case can be modelled similarly to any other process of innovation di↵usion with iVoters
initially being a distinct subgroup but over time becoming virtually indistinguishable from
ballot voters in terms of socio-demographic and attitudinal profiles.
This bring us neatly to the issue of repeated use of iVoting, what we have termed fidelity
to iVoting. We are not the first to have pointed to the question of fidelity. Alvarez et al.
(2009) mentioned a ‘faithfulness’ e↵ect in their analysis of the Estonian case. Indeed, they
state that “a very large proportion” of respondents to the telephone survey in 2007 that had
used the iVoting channel for the previous 2005 election, continued to use the iVoting channel
for the 2007 general election. This suggests a strong fidelity to iVoting e↵ect, especially
among the younger cohorts that are most likely to use iVoting in Estonia. In the context of
the Canadian case of repeated trials between 2003 and 2010, Goodman (2014) has suggested
that it is middle–aged and older voters that are more likely to iVote and that perhaps a
high familiarity and use of the Internet are not such powerful preconditions for iVoting.
While certainly interesting in terms of a potential fidelity e↵ect over time, the drawback of
this conclusion is that it is based on aggregate data –summary statistics of cross–sectional
surveys based on self–reporting by iVoters.
Apart from these more ‘anecdotal’ speculations there has been very little empirical work
on this dimension of interest. Two studies, however, stand out. The most detailed treatment
of the fidelity e↵ect to date, albeit one contained in a report that is dedicated to other aspects
of iVoting, is by Sciarini et al. (2013). Using longitudinal panel data similar to our own,
they suggest that the tendency to iVote over time diminishes by age, the older the less likely.
However, their treatment of the topic is very dissimilar to ours and includes non iVoters.2.
Solvak and Vassil (2016) provide by far the most theoretically sophisticated treatment of
2The Sciarini et al. (2013) report looks at two and three iVoting events, but only present summary
statistics. When they do look at longer term trends their analysis focuses on the propensity to never iVote
–a design that is very di↵erent to ours, which looks at fidelity towards iVoting for those that have iVoted.
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the fidelity question, which is referred to as the ‘stickiness’ of iVoting. Drawing on social
psychology theories appplied to habit association and turnout (Aldrich et al., 2011), they
investigate whether iVoting in Estonia is becoming habit forming. The analysis is based on
a cross–sectional surveys over a six election period that draws on respondents self–reporting
on the mode of participation during previous electoral contests. The conclusion from the
Estonian case is that, in parallel with iVoting’s di↵usion, there is a very strong ‘stickiness’
to iVoting, with previous iVoters between 13 to 19 times more likely to stick to the voting
channel in subsequent elections (Solvak and Vassil, 2016). This e↵ect conforms with a social
psychological explanation of habit formation.
Inspired by what we know from the theoretical and empirical literature on iVoting we
formulate four guiding hypotheses to structure the research. It is worth repeating that our
research question di↵ers from the most popular iVoting study design, i.e. comparing iVoters
to traditional voters. Our data mining strategy is based on an individual level tracking of
voters that have iVoted. The research question centres on explaining the determinants of
remaining loyal to the iVoting channel or what others have called the ‘stickiness’ of iVoting
(Solvak and Vassil, 2016). To test this fidelity e↵ect it is therefore necessary for a voter
to have selected the iVoting channel at least once. Having chosen the iVoting channel, we
formulate the following hypotheses about the propensity to stick to iVote:
H1: iVoting stickiness hypothesis. Having selected the iVoting channel at t1, voters are
more likely to remain faithful to the channel at t2, t3, t...,n than to switch back to their
traditional voting channel.
H2: Gender non–di↵erentiation hypothesis. The self–selection process involved in opting
to use the iVoting channel will tend to diminish gender di↵erences between male and
female voters in the propensity to iVote.
H3: Vote channel socialisation among digital natives hypothesis. Younger voters that have
iVoted are more likely to become socialised with the new channel and remain faithful
to it in subsequent voting events.
H4: Vote channel fidelity among seniors hypothesis. Older voters that have iVoted are
more likely to remain faithful to the voting channel in subsequent voting events.
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The guiding hypotheses operate at various levels and on the basis of distinctive putative
mechanisms. Drawing especially on the concept of iVoting’s stickiness (Solvak and Vassil,
2016), H1 posits a strong fidelity e↵ect. There is some evidence of this e↵ect from previous
studies including Alvarez et al. (2009) on the case of Estonia, where virtually all respondents
that had used iVoting in the 2005 local elections reported using the iVoting channel for the
2007 general elections. Similarly, Sciarini et al. (2013) report a strong fidelity e↵ect in two
cross–tab tables based on two and three repeated iVoting events in Geneva. The proportion
of voters that remained loyal to the iVoting channel for the two-event and three-event series
was 65.3 and 69.3 per cent respectively. Our analysis extends over a much longer series,
however, potentially a t1, t2..., t10 data series (see Section 3 for more details). Contrary
to H1, the remaining hypotheses posit specific individual level characteristics as potential
drivers of iVoting fidelity.
We focus on gender for H2 because of data availability and previous meta-studies showing
mixed results in relation to iVoting use (Serdu¨lt et al., 2015a). The argument behind H2 is
that while men appear to be more likely to experiment with iVoting, our analysis is based
on voters that have opted in to the iVoting channel in the first instance, a process of self–
selection that may counter gender bias. Since we are not trying to explain who is more likely
to opt–in to use the iVoting channel in the first instance but rather what drives fidelity to
the iVoting channel over time, we have no reason to believe that there should be di↵erences
between a self–selected group of male and female voters. This also chimes with di↵ussion
analyses in (Vassil et al., 2016; Solvak and Vassil, 2016) where gender does not play a role
as well as more general studies on an overall shrinking gender gap in connectivity Hargittai
and Shafer (2006).
The argument behind H3 is connected to notions of digital natives (Palfrey and Gasser,
2013). It flows directly from the insights of most empirical studies of iVoting that claim
younger voters –though not necessarily the youngest cohort– are most likely to iVote. In
short, those that have grown up and come of age as the internet has become ubiquitous are
most likely to become socialised with this form of remote voting (Christian Schaupp and
Carter, 2005; Choi and Kim, 2012).
The mechanism behind H4 parts from a di↵erent logic and is best understood in terms
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of the cost in learning to use iVoting. To begin with, iVoting requires voters to engage with
new security measures. Once this initial learning investment has been incurred, and given
their generally more conservative nature, we hypothesize that older voters are more likely
to exhibit higher fidelity to the new voting channel. It should be noted that H3 and H4 are
not rival hypotheses. It is possible to have higher propensities to stick to iVoting at the two
extremes of the age cohort, and to do so for di↵erent reasons.We return to this issue in the
analysis.
3. Case selection and methodology
3.1. Case selection
The dataset used in this analysis is a subset from the Geneva vote registry that includes
data for 10 federal level referendum events, between June 2012 and September 2014. It should
be noted that this is not an unusual level of referendum activity for Switzerland –a polity
where citizens can be called to the polls 4–5 times a year on federal issues (more if one adds
referendums at lower levels of political aggregation) (Linder, 2010). The analysis is restricted
to this specific period for which we have data. It should be noted that not all municipalities
–hereafter referred to as communes– in the canton of Geneva can be included. Geneva’s
iVoting trials have been available in only selected communes (about one third). Furthermore,
even when iVoting has been available in a commune it has been frequently interrupted in some
cases. It was necessary, therefore, to find a natural grouping of communes in which iVoting
was available uninterruptedly during the period under study. Table 2 includes the list of the
23 communes that have provided for iVoting in the past. As can be seen in Table 2 there are
15 communes –which are marked by an asterisk– that have provided uninterrupted iVoting
in the data series under consideration. These 15 communes constitute a natural grouping of
communes that is ideally suited for exploring patterns in iVoting at the individual level.
3.2. Methodology
The selection of voters for conducting the individual level tracking involved two steps.
We first identified all voters that had used iVoting at least once between the first and the
fifth referendum event in Table 2. This returned an N of 9,711 voters that constitutes our
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Table 2: Availability of iVoting across 23 communes in the Canton of Geneva for ten federal level referendum
events between June 2012 (ev1) and September 2014 (ev10). The asterisk marks the communes that form a
natural grouping on the basis of iVoting availability
Commune ev1 ev2 ev3 ev4 ev5 ev6 ev7 ev8 ev9 ev10
Anieres* x x x x x x x x x x
Avully - - x - - - - - - -
Avusy* x x x x x x x x x x
Bardonnex x x x x x x - - - -
Bernex* x x x x x x x x x x
Carouge* x x x x x x x x x x
Cartigny - - x - - - - - - -
Celigny - - x - - - - - - -
Chancy - - x - - - - - - -
Chene-Bougeries* x x x x x x x x x x
Chene-Bourg* x x x x x x x x x x
Collonge-Bellerive* x x x x x x x x x x
Cologny* x x x x x x x x x x
Confignon* x x x x x x x x x x
LeGrand-Saconnex* x x x x x x x x x x
Meyrin* x x x x x x x x x x
Onex* x x x x x x x x x x
Perly-Certoux* x x x x x x x x x x
Plan-les-Ouates* x x x x x x x x x x
Thonex - - - - - - - - - -
Troinex - - - - - - - - - -
Vandoeuvres* x x x x x x x x x x
Versoix - - - - - - - - - -
baseline dataset. In Figure 1 we show the distribution of these voters per commune based on
the case selection above. Having identified the voters in the baseline dataset, we then tracked
their choice of voting channel for all subsequent electoral events until the last data point in
our series, referendum event 10. More specifically, for each voter we compute a variable
which we define as the propensity to iVote –essentially a relative frequency of iVoting for all
voters in the dataset– that is calculated as follows:
P =
P
iV otesP
Events
(1)
Where P is an individual’s propensity to internet vote;
P
iV otes is the sum of sequential
instances in which the voter has selected the iVoting channel (excluding the voter’s first
iVote experience);
P
Events is the sum of referendum events in which the voter has turned
out after their first iVoting experience (i.e., it excludes any abstentions on the part of the
voter). This returns a variable with the range of 0–1. In the empirical analysis we use
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Figure 1: Distribution of voters per commune
the propensity to iVote variable as the outcome to be explained in the various regression
analyses conducted. The choice of appropriate regression models to deal with a proportions
dependent variable is further discussed in Section 4.
4. Empirical analysis
4.1. Descriptives
We begin by looking at some basic descriptives for the main explanatory variables used
in the analysis. Table 3 presents the main variables with their relevant frequencies and
proportions. The first three categories are among the few socio-demographics available in
the vote registry dataset. The age variable consists of six age cohorts.3 A core group of
interest within the age cohort variable is the ‘digital native’ group of under–30 year olds, the
first category. In terms of the gender category, there is some skew in the distribution with
46.6 percent female voters versus 53.4 percent male votes. Given that our baseline dataset
is made up of individuals that have self–selected into using the iVoting channel at least once
during the first five electoral events, and that the literature has suggested males are more
3Note we include separate analyses based on a non–transformed age variable in the appendix (e.g. see
Table A.5).
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics for main explanatory variables. Frequencies and proportions (per cent) relate
to the number of voters.
Variable Level N Percent
Age cohort 18–29 1,659 17.1
30–39 1,506 15.5
40–49 2,233 23.0
50–59 2,009 20.7
60–69 1,559 16.1
70 + 745 7.7
Gender Male 5,181 53.4
Female 4,530 46.6
Civil status Separated 1,020 10.5
Single 2,767 28.5
Married 5,924 61.0
Origin Geneva 6,085 62.7
Other 3,626 37.3
Voter type Model 2,058 21.2
Other 7,653 78.8
Commune type Suburban 7,346 75.6
High Income 2,365 24.4
N iVoting trials Low 2,852 29.4
Medium 2,744 28.3
High 4,115 42.4
likely to iVote than females, the preponderance of male voters is not surprising. Indeed, we
anticipated rather more skew in terms of the gender variable than was actually the case. For
the civil status variable we use a three–fold category rather than the o cial codes, which
include 12 di↵erent categories most of which are related to distinguishing between various
forms of separation. These are all combined in a ‘separated’ category that includes divorcees.
Moving on to some of the voting related variables we include a voter’s origin, which is a
binary variable if the voter is a citizen of Geneva or from an ‘other’ canton of Switzerland.
The ‘other’ category also includes foreign-born residents that have become naturalised Swiss
citizens. These are the only two types of citizens with voting rights at the federal level.4 The
next variable, voter type, is essentially a dummy variable that takes on the value ‘model’ if
the voter has participated in all referendum events in the data series.
4The ex–patriot community of Swiss living abroad also have voting rights, though we do not cover this
group in the analysis.
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Figure 2: Fidelity to iVoting channel (by gender and age). ‘Hybrid’ voters are those have used both traditional
voting channels and iVoting. The ‘Switchers’, have tried iVoting once and then switched back to their
traditional voting channel, while ‘Faithful’ voters have always used the iVoting channel.
Lastly, we also include two variables related to the communal characteristics. We use
the communal classification codes provided by the Swiss o ce of national statistics. Most
of the voters reside in communes classified as ‘suburban’ although about a quarter of voters
belong to so–called ‘high income’ communes. One last variable to be mentioned relates to
the variability in communal experience with iVoting trials. The range is from 3–15 prior
iVoting experiences for all the communes –though this also includes cantonal and communal
iVoting rather than just federal level experiences. We split the variable into three categories
where: ‘low’ refers to 3–7 prior iVoting trials, ‘medium’ is 8–11, and ‘high’ is iVoting 12–15
trials.
Having described the main variables we can now explore the distribution of the dependent
variable. We first do this by creating a categorical variable from the propensity to iVote
score. Figure 2 shows the categories of voters after their first iVoting experience. There
are three possible types: (i) voters that remained totally ‘faithful’ to the iVoting channel
for all subsequent referendum events; (ii) voters that ‘switched’ back to their original voting
channel; and (iii) voters that exhibited ‘hybrid’ patterns of vote channel selection. In terms
of any iVoting stickiness or fidelity e↵ect what the Geneva individual level data show is
this: although almost one third of voters (28.5 per cent) did remain faithful to the iVoting
channel, the majority either switched back to their previous vote channel (21.9 per cent) or
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Figure 3: Kernel density plot for dependent variable with the the propensity to iVote on the x axis and the
density on the y axis.
pursued hybrid strategies of mix and matching their vote channel (49.6 per cent). Figure 2
also shows the proportions based on the two main socio–demographic variables of interest,
gender and age.
Moving away from a categorical depiction of the types of voters we now focus on the
propensity to iVote, the dependent variable. Its distribution is shown in the kernel density
plot of Figure 3. The propensity to iVote variable has some special properties, which are
noted by the dashed line at the 0 and 1 values on the x axis. As previously mentioned
above, around half have either remained totally loyal to this voting channel in all subsequent
voting events (value 1) or abandoned the channel altogether (value 0). Between these two
peaks lie the range of ‘hybrid’ voters that have switched between voting channels throughout
the period of analysis. For a more thorough analysis we turn to an appropriate regression
analysis.
4.2. Determinants of iVoting fidelity
We begin by noting the nature of the dependent variable we are seeking to explain,
which is essentially a proportion. While an ordinary linear regression, such as an OLS, is not
appropriate for dealing with proportions data there are models within the more flexible family
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of generalized linear models (GLMs) that are well suited to to the task. Since the analysis is
conducted within the R statistical computing framework we follow the suggestions for dealing
with proportions data in the leading R textbook by (Crawley, 2012) (see also Gelman and
Hill 2006). The R environment o↵ers a simple method for dealing with proportions data
within a standard GLM framework. One key issue to address is the variability in sample
size used to compute the proportion. For instance, a voter could have a propensity to iVote
of 1, based on selecting the iVoting channel in event 1 and all subsequent referendum events
thereafter, i.e., through to event 10. Since the first iVote is used to identify voters in the
sample and then excluded, the numerator would be a count of 9 iVotes out of a possible 9
referendum events in the denominator. In another case a voter might have also used the
iVoting channel at the first available instance, but only participated in two subsequent events.
In this case the numerator would be 2 iVotes out of a sample of 2 referendum events as the
denominator. In both cases the propensity to iVote would be 1, as described in equation (1)
in Section 3. A simple way to account for this additional variability using a GLM within
the R environment is to create a two-way outcome vector specifying the numerator and
denominator defined in equation (1). The two-way outcome vector takes the following form:
[
P
iV otes,
P
Events P iV otes] (for a data example see Crawley (2012)).5
A last step of the analysis is to use the quasibinomial link function when specifying
the GLM regression model to account for overdispersion in the dependent variable.6 A
quasibinomial variance model can better deal with (0–1) data for which the variance is
larger than would be the case with binomial data (0,1). While the logit coe cients in the
model will be the same, the quasibinomial parameter in the model produces more robust
estimates of standard errors and adjusts what would otherwise be overconfident inferences
(Gelman and Hill, 2006).
There is an alternative approach to analysing the proportions data, which would be to
5An alternative is to simply use a weight function that takes on the value of the binomial denominator
when fitting the GLM regression.
6This is connected to a technical point whereby a GLM with a binomial link assumes that the residual
deviance is the same as the residual degrees of freedom. Where this is not the case, as is the case with our
data, it means that there is extra, unexplained variation, over and above the binomial variance assumed by
the model. To account for this a quasibinomial link should be used.
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use a beta regression model (Cribari-Neto and Zeileis, 2010). While obviously well suited
to the distribution of the propensity to iVote variable (as shown in the first plot in Figure
3), the drawback of a beta regression is that [0,1] values cannot be used in the model, i.e.,
the dependent variable can only take on values between 0 and 1. One approach to address
this shortcoming, is to split the baseline dataset into two. The first subset would consist of
voters whose iVoting propensity is either 0 or 1. In such a model the dependent variable
would be categorical with 0 or 1 scores and a standard logistic regression could be fit on this
subset of voters. For the remaining subset of voters whose propensity to iVote is between 0
and 1 (i.e. between the two dashed lines in the first plot Figure 3) a beta regression model
could be used. We conduct this analysis in addition to the quasibinomial GLM models as a
robustness check on the structural validity of our findings. The results in terms of our core
variables of interest turn out to be similar to the quasibinomial GLM. We therefore relegate
the reporting of these results to the Appendix.
For the remainder of this section we focus on the results from the quasibinomial GLM.
Table 4 presents the results of three models that are fitted to the data, with each model
adding additional variables. In the first model we use the basic socio-demographics: age
cohort, gender and civil status. We find statistically significant e↵ects for all three socio–
demographic variables. The first two variables, age cohort and gender, are easy to interpret.
The former appears to have a distinct e↵ect across all age cohorts. Compared to the 30–
39 age cohort, the digital natives (18–30 year olds) are less likely to remain faithful to the
iVoting channel after having used it at least once. On the other hand, all age cohorts above
the 30–39 reference category, right the way up to seniors who are 70 and above, are more
likely to exhibit fidelity to the internet voting channel. Indeed, the logit estimates are highest
for precisely this oldest age cohort. A significant e↵ect is also present with regard to the
gender variable, with females less likely to remain faithful to iVoting. With regard to civil
status, there does appear to be significant di↵erence between separated voters (this includes
divorcees) on the one hand, and married and single (i.e, who have never married) voters on
the other. However, we do not find that there are significant di↵erences between single and
married civil status when we change the reference category in the model.
In model 2, we add two voting related variables (see Table 4). The first, voter origin,
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suggests that there is no relationship between being a Geneva born citizen or a voter whose
origin is from either another canton or a voter who has acquired Swiss nationality and resides
in Geneva. This is important since more than one third of voters in our dataset are non
Geneva born citizens –though this is not surprising since Geneva is a canton that attracts
many Swiss citizens from other cantons as well as a high level of naturalised but foreign born
citizens. While voter origin does not play a role the type of voter does. The ‘model’ citizen
that participates in all referendum events, is also more likely to remain faithful to the iVoting
channel. Controlling for these additional variables does not alter levels of significance of the
core socio-demographic variables.
In the last model we add two variables related to the type of commune a voter resides
in and its prior experience with iVoting trials. We find that the commune type does not
matter. However, experience of prior iVoting trials does matter to a highly significant degree.
Specifically, a voter residing in a commune with a low number of prior iVoting trials is less
likely to remain faithful to the iVoting channel compared to a voter in a commune with an
average or medium level of previous trials. Importantly, there is no significant di↵erence
between voters in communes with an average level of prior iVoting experiences compared to
those in communes with higher levels. This suggests a possible reinforcement e↵ect, whereby
greater iVoting availability over time generates higher propensities to remain faithful to
iVoting, which then stabilise after an initial trial period. A similar dynamic was also noted
in the di↵usion of iVoting analysis conducted by Vassil et al. (2016). Lastly, we also find
that the core socio-demographic variables retain their levels of significance in model 3.
In terms of model selection, using a quasibinomial model means we cannot extract a
typical information criterion, such as an AIC or BIC coe cient, to adjudicate between
models.7 However, a simple method is to use an ANOVA to compare the quasibinomial
models and see whether there is statistically significant di↵erence between them using an
F measure test (Crawley, 2012). Doing so shows that there is a statistically significant
di↵erence between the models: model 1 compared to model 3 (F1,5 = 13.46, p < .0001);
7A quasibinomial model is not based on a maximum likelihood estimator. Although it is possible to
obtain quasi AIC and BIC scores for the models, this additional analysis is not necessary since it is clear
that it is necessary to retain the additional variables in model 3
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Table 4: Quasibinomial GLM regression with logit estimates and robust standard errors in parenthesis.
Model
(1) (2) (3)
Age cohort (ref:30–39)
18–29  0.145⇤  0.138⇤  0.169⇤
(0.065) (0.066) (0.066)
40–49 0.218⇤⇤⇤ 0.211⇤⇤⇤ 0.200⇤⇤⇤
(0.056) (0.056) (0.056)
50–59 0.166⇤⇤ 0.157⇤⇤ 0.142⇤
(0.057) (0.057) (0.057)
60–69 0.331⇤⇤⇤ 0.308⇤⇤⇤ 0.292⇤⇤⇤
(0.059) (0.060) (0.060)
70+ 0.361⇤⇤⇤ 0.334⇤⇤⇤ 0.310⇤⇤⇤
(0.071) (0.072) (0.072)
Gender (ref: Male)
Female  0.276⇤⇤⇤  0.270⇤⇤⇤  0.276⇤⇤⇤
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Civil Status (ref: Separated)
Single 0.197⇤⇤ 0.187⇤⇤ 0.189⇤⇤
(0.069) (0.069) (0.069)
Married 0.161⇤⇤ 0.157⇤⇤ 0.141⇤⇤
(0.053) (0.053) (0.053)
Voter origin (ref: Other)
Geneva  0.044  0.052
(0.033) (0.033)
Voter type (ref: Other)
Model 0.091⇤ 0.092⇤⇤
(0.036) (0.036)
Commune type (ref: Suburban)
High Income  0.011
(0.037)
Trials iVoting (ref: Average)
Low  0.225⇤⇤⇤
(0.042)
High 0.065
(0.039)
Constant 0.077 0.179⇤ 0.254⇤⇤
(0.069) (0.077) (0.082)
Observations 9,711 9,711 9,711
Note: ⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤p<0.01; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.001
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Figure 4: Dotplot chart showing the e↵ect size of all statistically significant predictors in regression model 3.
The logit odds estimates are on the x axis (with the horizontal error bars representing the 95% confidence
intervals)
and model 2 compared to model 3 (F1,3 = 19.62, p < .0001). We therefore retain model
3. In Figure 4 we plot the di↵erences in the coe cients among the statistically significant
variables of model 3. The dotplot of logit estimates with 95 per cent confidence intervals for
the main variables provides for a neat visualization of the di↵erences in e↵ect sizes. We can
clearly see the di↵erential e↵ects among the di↵erent age cohorts, with negative coe cients
for the digital natives (under 30 year olds), while the older cohorts have distinctively positive
coe cients. Another evident feature is the gender e↵ect with female voters less likely to be
loyal to the iVoting channel than their male counterpart. On the other hand, the di↵erence
between a model citizen who always turns out and the rest, although significant, involves a
very modest e↵ect.
To get a better handle on our core variables of interest, age cohort and gender, we fit
three additional models with binary transformations of the age variable. This allows us to
compare under 25, under 30 and under 40 age cohorts versus the rest while also controlling
for gender (see Table A.8 in Appendix for model specification and results). The resulting
fitted values can be plotted in a three-way interaction plot as shown in Figure 5. Both age
cohort and gender are statistically significant in all three models, though there is a di↵erence
in the slopes between under 25s on the one hand, and the two age cohorts of under 30s and
under 40s. This provides further evidence that no matter how we classify the digital natives
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age cohort, older voters are more likely to remain loyal to iVoting. Furthermore, there is a
clear gender di↵erentiation in propensities to iVote. Proceeding clockwise, the last plot in
Figure 5 uses the fitted values from model 3 in Table 4. It shows how the age cohort e↵ect
is being driven by the di↵erences between the under 40 age cohorts on the one hand and the
seniors, of 60 years and above, on the other.
Figure 5: Three-way interaction plots with two categorical variables: age (on the x axis) and gender (di↵erent
line type). On the y axis are the fitted values based on separate GLM quasibinomial models using three
di↵erent binary age variables (under 25, under 30 and under 40 respectively). Note that both age and gender
are significant predictors in all three models. The last model displays the fitted values from model 3 in Table
4 using all six age cohorts .
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5. Discussion
This paper’s main objective was to study the impact of introducing iVoting into a fed-
eralized political context in which other forms of remote voting by mail are already well–
established. More specifically, we sought to explain the determinants of fidelity towards
this new voting channel. Given its extensive experience with iVoting, including federal level
votes, the Swiss canton of Geneva o↵ers a unique setting for testing a number of hypotheses
regarding iVoting dynamics. Fortunately, we were able to gain access to unique panel data,
the canton’s o cial vote registry database. We then drew on the findings from the main
empirical studies of iVoting trials to date, to formulate four guiding hypotheses. Contra to
Solvak and Vassil (2016), we did not find evidence of iVoting stickiness or any overarching
fidelity e↵ect among the voters that had experimented with iVoting. Although almost one
third of voters did remain loyal to the iVoting channel the remaining two–thirds either aban-
doned iVoting or exhibited hybrid patterns in selecting among the available voting channels.
This finding also contrasts with what others have suggested (Alvarez et al., 2009; Sciarini
et al., 2013).
The three remaining hypotheses were related to the e↵ect of individual level character-
istics on the propensity to iVote. In view of the self–selection process in opting in to use
iVoting in the first instance, hypothesis two posited a gender non–di↵erentiation with regard
to iVoting fidelity. We were aware that women are less likely to internet vote to begin with,
as revealed by survey evidence. However, our baseline dataset was drawn from a group of
voters that had already self-selected into using iVoting at least once. We expected that this
self-selection process may have neutralised any gender e↵ect. This was not the case though.
The gender e↵ect remains pronounced even when drawn from a population that have opted
to use iVoting at least once –female voters are less likely than their male counterparts to
remain loyal to the iVoting channel, and this e↵ect is present across all age cohorts. We
do not o↵er an explanation for this other than speculating that those characteristics that
make women less likely to iVote in the first place may also carry through to women that
do self–select into using iVoting. There may be a di↵erential ‘novelty e↵ect’ among gender
types that is more pronounced for women than their male counterparts or a novelty e↵ect
among women might be induced by men living in same household –unfortunately we cannot
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test for this due to data restrictions.
The third hypothesis postulated a socialisation mechanism whereby digital natives’ initial
enthusiasm with iVoting would be reinforced over time. Such habit forming mechanisms
have been shown to be at play in the case of Estonia (Solvak and Vassil, 2016). Our results
were counter–intuitive regarding the age variable. Independently of how we measured age,
the older the voter, the more likely he or she would remain faithful to iVoting. Thus, we
found no support for the conventional wisdom: i.e., that the digital natives types are most
likely to become socialised with the iVoting channel compared to other age cohorts. On the
contrary, we found that they are most likely to abandon iVoting. One of the reasons for this
unexpected outcome could potentially be linked to the fact that Geneva already has a very
well established tradition of remote voting, that is postal voting, which is used by about 95
per cent of the electorate. Thus, digital natives can easily switch between two ultimately
very convenient voting channels, postal voting and iVoting. The other side of the coin is
that we did find supporting evidence for our fourth hypothesis related to a distinctive senior
age cohort e↵ect. We hypothesized a fidelity mechanism among seniors that had bothered
to incur the initial learning costs associated with adapting to iVoting from more familiar
channels. One potential explanation for this is that, having incurred the initial investment
in adapting to the iVoting channel, seniors are more loath to abandon it and therefore more
likely to remain loyal to the iVoting channel in subsequent referendum events.
We turn to issues of generalizability of our findings. As noted in the introduction, the
two countries with most extensive experience of iVoting are Estonia and Switzerland. Lesson
drawing from the former case is potentially more appropriate for small and unitary political
systems, especially ones with more centralized forms of electoral administration and limited
experience with other forms of remote voting such as postal voting. The Swiss case is very
di↵erent in this regard. It is one of the ‘classic’ federations (Australia, Canada and the US
are the others), and one which has a highly decentralised system for managing elections.
Furthermore, it possessed a fully generalized system of remote voting, by mail, prior to
the introduction of the iVoting channel. To that end, there are obvious lessons for other
political systems sharing these characteristics, especially some of the US states that also have
a vibrant tradition of direct democracy and generalised systems of voting by mail. What
24
our findings show is that there is an important gender and age cohort e↵ect. The latter has
potentially more significant policy implications. We echo Goodman (2014), who has studied
the Canadian experiences, in arguing that the introduction of iVoting may be more about
making the electoral process more convenient for the older generation and less about serving
as a tool for engaging the young. We find little evidence of iVoting socialization among the
young and would be very sceptical of any purported turnout boost for this age cohort given
the availability of iVoting. This seems to be especially the case in systems where the young
already have at their disposal very convenient forms of voting such as postal voting.
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Appendix A.
In this appendix we include additional analyses mentioned, but not presented in the main
text. The inclusion of these additional models can be thought of as a ‘robustness check’,
where the aim is to examine how ‘core’ variables behave when the specification is modified
by adding or removing variables as well as presenting di↵erent transformations of the ‘core’
age cohort variable as in Table A.5. Overall, we interpret the stability of the performance
of our ’core’ variables as evidence of structural validity of the analysis in the main text.
Nonetheless, there are some minor deviations that are illustrative. For instance, we find
that when using age as a continuous predictor variable, the statistically significant, positive
e↵ect of being separated disappears (see Table A.5). We are therefore more confident that
being married may have a positive e↵ect on iVoting fidelity compared to separate and single
voters. The significance levels and estimates for all other variables remain more or less the
same. Most importantly, we also include the results from an alternative method of analysis
based on a two subset transformation of the dataset. As mentioned in the main text, an
alternative analysis is to split the dataset into two: (1) voters that always iVoted or gave up
iVoting after their first iVoting experience, i.e., with values 0 or 1 in terms of their propensity
to iVote and (2) the remaining voters with propensity to iVote scores between 0 and 1. For
analysing subset (1) a logistic regression was used and for subset (2) a beta regression model
was used. The results for each subset are presented in Tables A.6 and A.7. The results are
essentially the same, albeit with higher logit estimates for the logistic regression and lower
coe cients for the beta regression.
The last table A.8 presents the results of the regression models used to create the plots
in 5.
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Table A.5: Quasibinomial glm with age as continuous
Model
(1) (2) (3)
age 0.008⇤⇤⇤ 0.008⇤⇤⇤ 0.008⇤⇤⇤
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Female  0.277⇤⇤⇤  0.271⇤⇤⇤  0.277⇤⇤⇤
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Single 0.136⇤ 0.125 0.117
(0.064) (0.064) (0.064)
Married 0.158⇤⇤ 0.155⇤⇤ 0.139⇤⇤
(0.053) (0.053) (0.053)
Origin:Geneva  0.044  0.052
(0.033) (0.033)
VoterType:Model 0.098⇤⇤ 0.098⇤⇤
(0.036) (0.036)
CommuneType:High Income  0.015
(0.037)
iVoting trials: Low  0.223⇤⇤⇤
(0.042)
iVoting trials: High 0.064
(0.039)
Constant  0.156  0.122  0.053
(0.086) (0.089) (0.093)
Observations 9,711 9,711 9,711
Note: ⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤p<0.01; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.001
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Table A.6: Logistic regression on subset of voters with values 0 or 1 in terms of propensity to iVote. Logit
estimates with standard errors in parentheses.
Model
(1) (2) (3)
18–30  0.248⇤⇤⇤  0.236⇤⇤⇤  0.288⇤⇤⇤
(0.052) (0.052) (0.053)
40–49 0.321⇤⇤⇤ 0.311⇤⇤⇤ 0.280⇤⇤⇤
(0.045) (0.045) (0.045)
50–59 0.232⇤⇤⇤ 0.215⇤⇤⇤ 0.188⇤⇤⇤
(0.046) (0.046) (0.046)
60–69 0.508⇤⇤⇤ 0.467⇤⇤⇤ 0.427⇤⇤⇤
(0.047) (0.048) (0.048)
70+ 0.522⇤⇤⇤ 0.488⇤⇤⇤ 0.430⇤⇤⇤
(0.056) (0.056) (0.057)
Female  0.474⇤⇤⇤  0.466⇤⇤⇤  0.476⇤⇤⇤
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Single 0.292⇤⇤⇤ 0.281⇤⇤⇤ 0.283⇤⇤⇤
(0.055) (0.055) (0.055)
Married 0.235⇤⇤⇤ 0.227⇤⇤⇤ 0.208⇤⇤⇤
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042)
Origin:Geneva  0.033  0.040
(0.027) (0.027)
TypeVoter:Model 0.157⇤⇤⇤ 0.154⇤⇤⇤
(0.029) (0.029)
Commune:High Income  0.055
(0.030)
iVoting trials:Low  0.358⇤⇤⇤
(0.034)
iVoting trials:High 0.055
(0.031)
Constant 0.176⇤⇤ 0.168⇤⇤ 0.315⇤⇤⇤
(0.054) (0.057) (0.061)
Observations 4,893 4,893 4,893
Log Likelihood  17,120.330  17,104.800  17,011.570
Note: ⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤p<0.01; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.001
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Table A.7: Beta regression on subset of voters with values on the dependent variable propensity to iVote
between 0–1. Logit estimates with standard errors in parentheses.
Model
(1) (2) (3)
18–30  0.037  0.034  0.052⇤
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
40–49 0.133⇤⇤⇤ 0.129⇤⇤⇤ 0.126⇤⇤⇤
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
50–59 0.115⇤⇤⇤ 0.110⇤⇤⇤ 0.104⇤⇤⇤
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
60–69 0.159⇤⇤⇤ 0.149⇤⇤⇤ 0.143⇤⇤⇤
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
70+ 0.177⇤⇤⇤ 0.160⇤⇤⇤ 0.153⇤⇤⇤
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Female  0.095⇤⇤⇤  0.091⇤⇤⇤  0.096⇤⇤⇤
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Single 0.094⇤⇤⇤ 0.089⇤⇤⇤ 0.091⇤⇤⇤
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Married 0.087⇤⇤⇤ 0.087⇤⇤⇤ 0.077⇤⇤⇤
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Origin Geneva  0.028⇤  0.033⇤⇤
(0.011) (0.011)
VoterType:Model 0.045⇤⇤⇤ 0.047⇤⇤⇤
(0.012) (0.012)
CommuneType: High Income 0.024
(0.013)
iVoting trials: Low  0.097⇤⇤⇤
(0.015)
iVoting trials: High 0.054⇤⇤⇤
(0.013)
Constant  0.007 0.002 0.020
(0.024) (0.025) (0.027)
Observations 4,818 4,818 4,818
Log Likelihood 2,259 2,269 2,339
Note: ⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤p<0.01; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.001
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Table A.8: Quasibinomial regression with the age predictor as a binary variable among di↵erent digital
native cohorts. Logit estimates with standard errors in parentheses. The fitted values from these models
were used to construct the interaction plots in Figure 5.
Model
(1) (2) (3)
under–25  0.156⇤⇤
(0.056)
under–30  0.306⇤⇤⇤
(0.045)
under–40  0.285⇤⇤⇤
(0.035)
Female  0.282⇤⇤⇤  0.280⇤⇤⇤  0.280⇤⇤⇤
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Constant 0.403⇤⇤⇤ 0.434⇤⇤⇤ 0.470⇤⇤⇤
(0.022) (0.023) (0.024)
Observations 9,711 9,711 9,711
Note: ⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤p<0.01; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.001
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